Е. В. Падучева

СТАТЬИ РАЗНЫХ ЛЕТ

ЯЗЫКИ СЛАВЯНСКИХ КУЛЬТУР
МОСКВА 2009
тиация в языке», посвященный критике собираторского тезиса о произвольности знака. Но как следует из аннотации, речь в этом сборнике идет о мотивированных связях между значениями слова — о которых говорилось выше и которые являются сейчас главным предметом внимания в обычной семантике: эпитет «когнитивная» факультативен.

Современную семантику, в которой гармонично интегрирована перечисленная выше совокупность идей и подходов, конечно, можно было бы назвать когнитивной. Ведь только в том, что этот эпитет приобрел отчетливо рекламный привкус, ср. высокую частотность слова «когнитивный» в названиях диссертаций и широкое распространение сочетаний когнитивный диссонанс, когнитивный образ, когнитивный анализ. Все они красиво звучат, но не имеют ясного значения: почему не сказать семантический диссонанс?

Выступать ПРОТИВ «когнитивной лингвистики» не имеет смысла в той же мере, что и бороться ЗА нее. Можно думать, что в скором времени эпитет «когнитивная» износится и отпадет сам собой. Так было в свое время с эпитетом «структурная» (лингвистика). От структурной лингвистики остался, однако, метод минимальных пар, установка на точность и ряд других принципов, которые сохраняют свою ценность. Что останется от когнитивного акцента в семантике, покажет будущее.

Несомненно, однако, что в лингвистической семантике в последнее десятилетие произошел ряд сдвигов фокуса внимания: от денотаций к концептуализации; от семиотики к многозначности; от перечной значений к иерархиям, обоснованным моделями семантических переходов. Эти сдвиги не такие заметные, как «компьютерная революция», но существенные: в центре внимания оказались новые области, которые раньше не были доступны исследователю. Сейчас для них подготовлена почва, и в этом большая заслуга когнитивистов.

—— Письмо Типе Нессета. On the epithet “cognitive”

Thank you very much for letting me read your article. Since it is about epithets, I would like to mention two that describe my impression of your text. First of all, I find it fresh. It looks at cognitive semantics from a different angle, which I find very stimulating — especially since your overview of different schools and ideas in the east and west is truly amazing. Another epithet that came to my mind while reading your article is balanced. I enjoyed reading your sober and factual prose. At this point you are probably expecting a “however”, so let me warn you that I am not planning on constructing an argument in this little text. What I would like to do, is to offer you some reflections based on a couple of points in your article. If they turn out to be of interest for you, I would be proud.

Cognitive linguistics and also cognitive semantics are currently used as names of a linguistic theory or framework. If we ask whether we need the epithet “cognitive”
in the name of a linguistic theory, it may be useful to ask what linguistic theories are. (For convenience, I will use the term “theory” — others may prefer “framework” or “model”, while some linguists use all these terms, but with different meanings.) Obviously, a linguistic theory can be understood as a (hopefully) consistent set of ideas about language. But at the same time there is a sociological dimension to linguistic theories. When people share the same ideas, these ideas define a social group of researchers. In this way, theories become the demarcation line between different groups of linguists who are engaged in a power struggle. People want to attract good students, hire people who support “their” theory, etc. What this adds up is the following. Asking whether we need the epithet “cognitive” is really two questions. Does the epithet give an accurate description of the ideas in question, and is it a “good” label for a group of researchers?

I would like to offer two comments on the sociological question. First of all, the epithet “cognitive” became popular on the American West Coast. I think it is very hard for Europeans (including me) to understand how hostile the environment was when Lakoff and Langacker started to develop their ideas in the late 1970s. In the US, almost all linguistic departments at the prestigious universities were (and still are) dominated by Chomskian generative linguistics. The “syntactic wars” that led to the suppression of the generative semantics “heresy” were still fresh in people’s minds. It was (and probably is) difficult for young researchers who sympathized with cognitive linguistics to get jobs in the US. I have often felt that some of the central people in cognitive linguistics use a somewhat aggressive rhetoric, and that not enough credit is given to other theories. This is something I have always found irritating myself, but I think to some extent the explanation is in the hostility of the environment, in which “cognitive semantics” was born.

A second comment on the sociological question concerns your point about “рекламный привкус” on p. 10. I assume that your complaint is that some researchers use the epithet “cognitive” for self-promotion because it looks “catchy”, “trendy” or “fancy”, although the epithet doesn’t really provide a good description of the content of their work. I believe this is regrettable, but unavoidable. When a word gets prestigious, everybody starts using it, and the word loses its meaning. But there is a sense where “advertising” is important. In order for important ideas like prototypes, radial categories and metaphor to have a chance to be taken seriously in American linguistics, it was absolutely necessary to bring them together as a “theory” with a catchy name. The epithet “cognitive” was chosen to do the job, and I believe it did it well. At the same time, your article reminds me how different this looks from a European, and maybe especially from a Russian perspective. Without the context of syntactic wars and a power struggle with a totally dominant generative linguistics, much of the rhetorical use of the “cognitive” epithet becomes meaningless.

This brings us back to the more fundamental question whether “cognitive” actually tells us anything about the content of the ideas. On p. 9, you argue that linguistics has given more to psychology than psychology has given to linguistics. I cannot assess this claim, but I would like to point out that the ideas about prototypes and radial categories came from psychology to linguistics through the work of Eleanor Rosch in the
1970s. I don’t know the details, but I would not think it is a coincidence that Rosh is at Berkeley — the same university as Lakoff. Not all cognitive semanticists are directly involved in research that go beyond linguistics, but ideas from cognitive science have indeed shaped cognitive linguistics, including cognitive semantics. Langacker’s work on the usage-based model, for instance, takes connectionism seriously. An article by Dodge and Lakoff from 2005 tries to establish connections between image schemas and brain activity, and Jerome Feldman’s recent monograph “From molecule to metaphor” tries to integrate cognitive linguistics and artificial intelligence. So in this sense, I think cognitive semantics really is “cognitive”.

It is tempting to compare cognitive linguistics with chomskian generative grammar. If one argues that language is part of biology, this sounds very “cognitive”, but if one adds that language constitutes an autonomous module in the mind / brain, which follows different principles than the rest of human cognition, there isn’t much left of the cognitive commitment. But this position may be a caricature, rather than an accurate description of Chomsky’s views, of course. I enjoyed reading your little discussion of innateness on p. 2. I have always found it hard to take the innateness hypothesis seriously. If one wants to argue that language is the way it is because it is innate, the most reasonable strategy would be to try to explain as much as possible from independent principles of cognition, communication etc. What remains unexplained could be attributed to innateness. This point has been made by several researchers, for instance Lakoff and Richard Hudson. Instead, it seems that innateness has been abused to “protect” linguistics from healthy interaction with related fields.

Let me turn to your discussion of polysemy (p. 5ff.), which I found very lucid (another epithet). I have always found network-based models interesting and insightful. It strikes me as not very fruitful to list a set of meanings of a linguistic element if one doesn’t attempt at characterizing the connections between the meanings. That’s where the fun is! I am very glad that the Russian tradition focuses on such connections, which I believe is one of the reasons why many Russian colleagues find cognitive linguistics familiar and interesting, albeit not radically new. In any case, the focus on meanings and the connections between them is one of the reasons why we tell our students that what we are doing is close to the Russian linguistic tradition.

In parentheses: There is another link between cognitive linguistics and Russia. Laura has written a little article where she argues that cognitive linguistics can be considered a continuation of the Jakobsonian tradition. This is a claim that certainly needs modification. For one thing, Jakobson’s work was an important source of inspiration for the early generative linguists, as is well known. Nevertheless Laura argues that even though Jakobson focused on abstract invariant meanings, he was quite close to the network conception when he talked about “relative invariants”. Incidentally, a cognitive linguistics network analysis enables us to capture both Jakobsonian invariant meanings as well as several “surface” meanings. In a sense, it could be argued that e.g. Laura’s analyses of Russian case are a synthesis of Jakobson’s abstract invariants and Wierzbicka’s focus on surface case.
Let me, finally, say a few words on your very stimulating discussion of metaphor. Your claim that Lakoff & Johnson are doing phraseology and not metaphor is very interesting, but it depends on the definition of "metaphor". Lakoff & Johnson do indeed use the term "metaphor" in an untraditional way. Their definition is a "cross-domain mapping relation" (cf. Lakoff’s article from 1993 on the "Contemporary theory of metaphor"). The problem with this definition is that it is hard to specify exactly what a domain is. But it does allow Lakoff and his associates to make their well-known claims about the relevance of metaphor not only for everyday language, but also for thinking and action. I find these claims interesting, but I do understand that Lakoff & Johnson’s use of "metaphor" gives one broad heading for a number of quite diverse phenomena — which probably involves certain disadvantages.

So, do we need the epithet “cognitive”? I think it depends on whether we are dealing with sociology or “pure” ideas. I wouldn’t want to invest too much in a label, because labels like this come and go. I am convinced that we need a kind of linguistics that takes findings in cognitive science seriously and tries to build bridges between interrelated fields. I am furthermore convinced that we need semantic analysis that focuses on the connections in networks of interrelated meanings.

Tore NESSET
Vice-president of Slavic Cognitive Linguistics Association
University of Tromsø, Norway